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Kelly Betting Can Be Too Conservative
Chung-Han Hsieh,1 B. Ross Barmish,2 and John A. Gubner3
Abstract—Kelly betting is a prescription for optimal resource
allocation among a set of gambles which are typically repeated
in an independent and identically distributed manner. In this
setting, there is a large body of literature which includes
arguments that the theory often leads to bets which are “too
aggressive” with respect to various risk metrics. To remedy this
problem, many papers include prescriptions for scaling down
the bet size. Such schemes are referred to as Fractional Kelly
Betting. In this paper, we take the opposite tack. That is, we
show that in many cases, the theoretical Kelly-based results
may lead to bets which are “too conservative” rather than
too aggressive. To make this argument, we consider a random
vector X with its assumed probability distribution and draw m
samples to obtain an empirically-derived counterpart Xˆ . Sub-
sequently, we derive and compare the resulting Kelly bets for
both X and Xˆ with consideration of sample size m as part of
the analysis. This leads to identification of many cases which
have the following salient feature: The resulting bet size using
the true theoretical distribution for X is much smaller than that
for Xˆ . If instead the bet is based on empirical data, “golden”
opportunities are identified which are essentially rejected when
the purely theoretical model is used. To formalize these ideas, we
provide a result which we call the Restricted Betting Theorem. An
extreme case of the theorem is obtained whenX has unbounded
support. In this situation, using X , the Kelly theory can lead
to no betting at all.
I. INTRODUCTION
Kelly betting is a prescription for optimal resource allocation
among a set of gambles which are typically repeated in an
independent and identically distributed manner. This type
of wagering scheme was first introduced in the seminal
paper [1]. Following this work, many applications and a
number of properties of Kelly betting were introduced in
the literature over subsequent decades; e.g., see [3]-[5]
and [9]. To complete this overview, we also mention more
recent work [8], [13]-[15] and the comprehensive survey [11]
covering many of the most important papers.
In its simplest form, the Kelly criterion tells the bettor what
is the optimal fraction of capital to wager. As the optimal
Kelly fraction increases, various risk measures can become
unacceptably large. In this regard, the optimal Kelly fraction
is often characterized as too “aggressive.” To avoid this
negative, there is a body of literature dealing with so-called
“fractional strategies.” Such strategies essentially amount to
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reduction of the optimal Kelly fraction so that less capital is
at risk on each bet; e.g., see [6]-[10] and [12].
In contrast to existing literature, the focal point of this paper
is to describe scenarios when the Kelly-based theory may
actually lead to bets which are too conservative rather than
too aggressive. Our results along these lines are captured in
the “Restricted Betting Theorem,” its corollaries and general-
ization given in Sections 5 and 6. To motivate these results, in
the preceding sections, we formally describe the theoretical
framework being considered, explain what is meant by “data-
based Kelly betting” and provide motivating examples which
illustrate how overly conservative betting can result.
With regard to the above, we consider the following scenario:
A bettor entertains a sequence of gambles from two different
points of view. The first point of view is that of the
theoretician who works with a model of the returns as a
sequence of independent and identically distributed random
variables with a known probability density function. Using
the prescription of Kelly for sizing the bet, this bettor arrives
at the optimal fraction K∗ of one’s wealth which should
be wagered on each play. The second point of view is that
of the data-based practitioner who makes bets based on an
empirically derived probability mass function obtained by
drawing samples of the random variable. In this setting, we
describe an example which leads to dramatically different
bets for the theoretician versus the practitioner. For this
example, we see that a data-based practitioner deems the bet
to be highly favorable and determines that the optimal betting
fraction should be large. However, for this same example, use
of the true probability distribution by the theoretician may
lead to little or no betting.
The main theoretical result in the paper, the Restricted Bet-
ting Theorem, is paraphrased for the simplest case, a scalar
random variable, as follows: If Xmin < 0 and Xmax > 0
are respectively the infimum and supremum of points in
the support set X , the optimal Kelly fraction must lie
between −1/Xmax and −1/Xmin. For the extreme case
when the support of the distribution is unbounded both from
above and below, this implies the optimal fraction K∗ = 0.
That is, the optimum is not to bet at all. More generally,
when X is an n-dimensional random vector, the support
set X imposes a fundamental restriction on size of the
optimal bet fraction K which is described by hX (−K) ≤ 1
where hX is the classical support function used in convex
analysis. Following the detailed explanation of this result, the
final part the paper considers the issue of “betting frequency”
and how it bears upon the difference of bet sizes for the
practitioner versus the theoretician. Finally, in the concluding
section, some promising directions for future research are
described.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, to make our points about conservatism, we
consider one of the simplest formulations of the problem:
The bettor is faced with N gambles with each individual
return governed by an independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) random vector X ∈ Rn having probability
density function (PDF) fX . On the k-th bet, fraction Ki of
one’s account value V (k) is bet on the i-th componentXi(k)
of X . We allow Ki < 0 so that the theory is flexible enough
to allow the bettor to take either side of the bet being offered.
For example, if Xi > 0 corresponds to a coin flip coming up
as heads, the use of Ki = 1/2 corresponds to a bet of 50%
of one’s account on heads and Ki = −1/2 corresponds to
a bet of 50% on tails. As a second example, in the case
of the stock market, allowing Ki < 0 corresponds to short
selling; i.e., when Xi(k) < 0, the bettor wins. In the sequel,
we take
K =
[
K1 K2 · · · Kn
]T
.
Then, based on the discussion above, the investment level
for the i-th bet at stage k is given in feedback form
as Ii(k) = KiV (k) and the associated account value is given
by the equation
V (k + 1) = V (k) +
n∑
i=1
Ii(k)Xi(k)
with initial account value V (0) > 0.
Admissible Bet Size: In the sequel, we let X ⊆ Rn
denote the support of X and we require for all x ∈ X ,
the admissible K must satisfy the condition
1 +KTx ≥ 0.
The condition above is to assure satisfaction of the survival
requirement; i.e., along any sample path, V ≥ 0. Henceforth,
we denote the totality of corresponding constraints above
on K by K. Now letting X(k) be the k-th outcome of X
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N−1, the dynamics of the account value
at stage k + 1 are described by the recursion
V (k + 1) = (1 +KTX(k))V (k).
Then, the Kelly problem is to selectK ∈ K which maximizes
the expected value of the logarithmic growth
g(K)
.
=
1
N
E
[
log
(
V (N)
V (0)
)]
.
Using the recursion for V (k) above and the fact that
the X(k) are i.i.d., we see that the expected log-growth
function reduces to
g(K) =
1
N
E
[
log
(
N−1∏
k=0
(
1 +KTX (k)
))]
=
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
E[log
(
1 +KTX (k)
)
]
=
∫
X
log(1 +KTx)fX(x)dx
which is readily shown to be a concave function of K .
Subsequently, when the constraint K ∈ K is included, we
seek to find the optimal logarithmic growth
g∗
.
= max
K∈K
g(K)
and we denote a corresponding optimal element by K∗.
III. BETTING BASED ON DATA VERSUS THEORY
When Kelly betting is used in practice, it is typically not the
case that a perfect probability density function model fX(x)
for the random variable X is available. The practitioner
obtains a number of data samples x1, x2, . . . , xm for X and
then proceeds along one of two possible paths: The first
path involves assuming a functional form for fX(x) and
then using the data xi to estimate the parameters of this
distribution and the associated estimate fˆX(x). For example,
if one assumes that the samples xi come from a normal dis-
tribution, the mean µˆ and standard deviation σˆ are estimated
from the data and one uses the normal distribution N (µˆ, σˆ)
in the betting analysis to follow. The second possibility is
that no constraints are imposed upon the form of fX and
one simply works with an empirical approximation fˆX(x)
for the true PDF fX(x). This empirical Probability Mass
Function (PMF) is given by the sum of impulses
fˆX(x) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
δ(x− xi).
In this case, when Kelly betting is considered, fˆX(x) is used
as input to the optimization of g(K) and a maximizer, call
it Kˆ∗, is used as the betting fraction. For the background
probability theory underlying the analysis to follow, the
reader is referred to [16].
Given the scenario above, the following questions present
themselves: If we base our betting fraction Kˆ on fˆX rather
than fX , how will the optimum Kˆ
∗ compare with the “true”
optimum K∗? What sample size m is needed so that the
empirically-based optimal performance is acceptably close to
the true optimum? Perhaps the simplest possible illustration
of these ideas is obtained by considering X to be a scalar
corresponding to the outcome of repeated flipping of a biased
coin with probability of heads being p > 1/2. Assuming an
even-money bet, we take X = 1 for heads and X = −1
for tails. Then, if one has a perfect knowledge of p, it is
readily verified that g(K) is maximized via K∗ = 2p − 1.
On the other hand, if the Kelly bets are being derived from
empirical samples x1, x2, . . . , xm in {−1, 1} with xi = 1
being the return for “heads,” then the sample mean
pˆ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
max{xi, 0}
is used as input to the analysis and one obtains
Kˆ∗ = max{2pˆ− 1, 0}
as the optimal betting fraction.
IV. HOW OVERLY CONSERVATIVE BETS ARISE
Beginning with an empirically derived PMF as described
above, our first objective in this section is as follows: We de-
scribe the key ideas driving many scenarios where the Kelly
bettor who uses “pure theory” in lieu of empirical data may
reach a conclusion about the optimal bet size which entirely
contradicts common sense real-world considerations. That
is, we describe a scenario which demonstrates how formal
application of the Kelly theory can lead to a bet size which is
far smaller than merited by analysis of risk versus return. Our
second objective is to provide a realistic numerical example
showing that this pathology which we describe is realizable
using real data. To this end, we consider a scenario involving
samples drawn from a normal distribution.
Pathology Explained for a Toy Example: We consider
one of the simplest possible Kelly betting problems. It is
described by a Bernoulli random variable X whose PMF is
given as follows: P (X = 1) = 1− ε and P (X = −x0) = ε
where x0 ≫ 1, and
0 < ε <
1
1 + x0
.
For this simple scenario, the Kelly betting problem is easily
solved via existing literature. For the sake of completeness,
we describe the solution. Indeed, we initially hold ε and x0
fixed and later consider the consequence of varying these
parameters. We first compute
g(K) = E[log(1 +KX)]
= (1 − ε) log(1 +K) + ε log(1−Kx0)
and note that this function is readily maximized with re-
spect to K using ordinary calculus. Via a lengthy but
straightforward calculation, we obtain the optimal Kelly
fraction K = K∗ with
K∗ =
1− ε(1 + x0)
x0
which is readily verified to satisfy
0 < K∗ <
1
x0
.
This is consistent with the observation that K ≥ 1/x0 leads
to log(1 −Kx0) = −∞ irrespective of the size of ε. Now,
the key point to note is the following: No matter how small ε
is, the size of K∗ is limited by 1/x0. In other words, even
when the risk ε of losing becomes negligible, for the Kelly
bettor using this theoretical model, the size of the bet will
be inappropriately small. For example, with x0 = 100, no
matter how small ε is, the betting fraction K can never
be more than 1% of the account value. In summary, when
situations arise with common sense dictating that one should
wager almost all of one’s account, the formal Kelly theory
forces the betting fraction to be far too small; i.e., an overly
conservative bet results.
To complete the arguments related to this toy example,
we now imagine a “practitioner” who is enamored with
Kelly theory but distrusting of a theoretical model. Suppose
further that empirical data for the random variable X above
is available, perhaps in limited supply. In this case, per
the discussion in Section 2, this bettor collects m data
points, generates an empirical PMF, and then, based on this
estimated distribution, determines the optimal bet. What will
happen when ε is extremely small? Clearly, without m being
unacceptably large, it is virtually certain that the bettor will
see xi = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Hence, the empirically
derived PMF for the estimated random variable Xˆ is trivially
described. Namely, Xˆ = 1 with probability one and the
resulting expected log-growth maximizer, namely Kˆ∗ = 1
is more consistent with the common sense maxim: “When
conditions are right, bet the farm.”
The arguments above are not intended to be entirely rigor-
ous because the role of the sample size m has not really
been considered. To tighten up the arguments above, we
note the following: In practice, there is a limitation on m,
say m ≤M , which can arise for various reasons. For ex-
ample, if X(k) represents daily returns on a stock, then it
would typically be the case thatm is strongly limited because
the underlying assumption of independent and identically
distributed returns becomes questionable when m is too
large. For example, many traders do not use large M in the
belief that larger M -values require processing of “old data”
which may not reflect current market conditions. For the case
of the random variable X in the toy example above, we can
ask: What is the probability, call it pbad, that the practitioner
will see a “bad” sample; i.e., xi = −x0 for some i ≤ M .
For this simple problem, we obtain
pbad = 1− (1− ε)
M .
Thus, if ε = 0.001 andM = 50, then we obtain pbad ≈ 0.05
and if ε = 0.0001, pbad ≈ 0.005. Note that if such a bad
sample is “seen,” the behavior of the practitioner becomes
similar to that of the theoretical Kelly bettor.
A More Realistic Example: To study the issue of conser-
vatism using realistic data, we consider a family of random
variables each of which is governed by the normal distri-
bution. Each of these random variables has fixed standard
deviation σ = 1. However, the members of this family are
differentiated by their means. We consider means 0 ≤ µ ≤ 4.
For each value of µ in this range, we let Xµ denote
the random variable of interest and construct an empirical
probability mass function drawing m = 1, 000, 000 samples.
Next, for each µ, we find the optimal Kelly fraction, call
it Kˆ∗ = Kˆ∗(µ); see Figure 1 where this function is plotted.
Looking at the plot, we now argue that this result is consistent
with common sense considerations. Indeed, when µ is at the
low end of the range, it is no surprise to see that Kˆ∗(µ) is
small because the probability of Xµ < 0 is significant. For
example, when µ = 1, the optimum is to wager about 20%
of one’s wealth on each bet. Similarly, when µ is at the
high end of the range, we see that Kˆ∗(µ) is large because
the probability of Xµ < 0 becomes small. For example,
when µ = 4, the optimum is to wager about 90% of
one’s wealth on each bet because the chance of losing is
vanishingly small.
In the next section, we see that this analysis using real data
is entirely at odds with a purely theoretical analysis. In this
regard, when the analysis in the section to follow is used to
analyze the random variables Xµ, one ends up with optimal
betting fraction K∗ = 0; i.e., no betting at all is dictated. To
conclude this section, we note the following: The fact that
our data-based analysis above was carried out with fixed σ is
not critical to the conclusions we reached. More generally,
when X is governed by normal distribution N (µ, σ), the
Kelly theory suggests no betting regardless of the relative
sizes of the mean µ and standard deviation σ.
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Fig. 1: Optimal Kelly Fraction Kˆ∗ Versus µ
V. RESTRICTED-BETTING: THE SCALAR CASE
In this section, we present an analysis regarding the moti-
vating examples in the preceding section. In rough terms,
for a scalar random variable X , we see that the minimum
and maximum values of points x in the support lead to
fundamental restrictions on the size of the bet allowed by
the Kelly theory — the larger these values, the smaller the
Kelly fraction is forced to be. Moreover, this restriction holds
true whether the probability of these maximal deviations is
significant or not.
Since the key ideas driving the analysis to follow are most
simply understood when X is a scalar random variable, we
first consider this case. To begin, suppose x0 < 0 is a point
in the support set of X . Then, to avoid g(K) = −∞, Kelly
theory forces the betting fraction to satisfyK ≤ −1/x0. This
holds true even when the probability that X gets close to x0
is vanishingly small. Similarly, for a point x0 > 0 in the
support, similar reasoning forces K ≥ −1/x0. As a result
of this aspect of the theory, many bets which are “excellent”
from a common sense point of view lead to unduly small
bets. We note that this is consistent with the examples in
Section 3. To summarize, in the Kelly theory, large values
of X , whether rare or not, lead to dramatic restrictions in
the bet size.
In the lemma below, we formalize the ideas above. An
extreme case of the result occurs when the support of X is
the entire real line; e.g., suppose X is normally distributed.
For such cases, as seen below, K = 0 is forced. That is,
no betting is allowed. This result holds true regardless of
the relative sizes of the mean µ and standard deviation σ.
We note that this outcome of Kelly theory is clearly at odds
with practical considerations. Even when the ratio µ/σ is
very large, synonymous with an excellent bet, the theory
nevertheless forces K = 0. The lemma below is a special
case of the Restricted Betting Theorem given in the next
section. Accordingly, its proof is deferred until then.
Scalar Betting Lemma: Let X be a random variable
with E[|X |] < ∞, probability density function fX(x) and
support X with extremes
Xmin
.
= inf{x : x ∈ X} and Xmax
.
= sup{x : x ∈ X}
satisfying Xmin < 0 and Xmax > 0. Then any optimizing
Kelly fraction K maximizing g(K) satisfies the interval
confinement condition
K ∈ [−1/Xmax,−1/Xmin].
Remarks: (i) Consistent with the remarks prior to the
statement of the lemma, K∗ ≤ 0 when Xmin = −∞
and K∗ ≥ 0 when Xmax = +∞. It follows that K = 0
is forced. In other words, the best bet is no bet at all.
(ii) The lemma says that an optimal K must lie in the
confinement interval, but we do not expect every K in
the interval to be optimal. Surprisingly, there may exist
some K in the confinement interval that are “infinitely bad,”
i.e., g(K) = −∞, as shown in the following example.
Example: We provide an example of a random variable X
and a constant K > 0 satisfying the confinement condition
above but having the property that g(K) = −∞. Indeed,
let 0 < K < 1 be arbitrary and held fixed in the calculations
to follow. We now consider a random variable X which is
constructed as follows. Let
θ
.
=
1
2
+
∞∑
k=1
1
k2
=
1
2
+
pi2
6
,
take X = x0 = 1 with probability p0 = 1/(2θ),
and for k ≥ 1, take X = xk
.
= (e−k − 1)/K with
probability pk
.
= 1/(k2θ). Note that the definition of θ
above assures that the pk define a probability mass func-
tion; i.e., pk ≥ 0 and
∑∞
k=0 pk = 1. Now, for this random
variable, we have Xmin = −1/K, and Xmax = 1. Further-
more, since 0 < K < 1, the interval confinement condition
is satisfied. To complete the analysis, it remains to show
that g(K) = −∞. Indeed, we calculate
g (K) = E[log (1 +KX)]
=
∞∑
k=0
log (1 +Kxk) pk
= log (1 +Kx0) p0 +
∞∑
k=1
log (1 +Kxk) pk
=
1
2θ
log (1 +K) +
1
θ
∞∑
k=1
1
k2
log (1 +Kxk)
=
1
2θ
log (1 +K)−
1
θ
∞∑
k=1
1
k
= −∞.
VI. THE RESTRICTED BETTING THEOREM
Recalling the interval confinement condition introduced for a
scalar random variable, this section provides a generalization
of this result which holds for an n-dimensional random
vector X whose support set X can be rather arbitrary. This
support set is allowed to be unbounded so that we capture
the no-betting result given forX being a scalar. To obtain the
theorem below, we make use of the classical support function
which is heavily used in convex analysis; e.g., see [17].
Indeed, given a set X ⊆ Rn, the support function on X
is the mapping h : Rn → R ∪ {+∞} defined as follows:
For y ∈ Rn,
hX (y)
.
= sup
x∈X
yTx.
After establishing the theorem below, we consider a number
of special cases to show that there are large classes of Kelly
betting problems for which checking for satisfaction of the
conditions is highly tractable.
The Restricted Betting Theorem: Given an n-dimensional
random vector X with PDF fX , support X ,
and E[‖X‖] <∞, any optimizing Kelly fraction vector K
satisfies the condition
hX (−K) ≤ 1.
Furthermore, whether X is convex or not, the set
K
.
= {K : hX (−K) ≤ 1}
is convex and closed.
Proof: In the arguments to follow, we work with the extended
logarithmic function which takes value log(x) = −∞
for x ≤ 0. Proceeding by contradiction, supposeK is optimal
but fails to satisfy the support function condition above. Then
sup
x∈X
[−K]Tx > 1.
Equivalently, there exists some xK ∈ X such
that −KTxK > 1. Hence 1 + KTxK < 0. Now
noting that 1+KTx is continuous in x and that xK is in the
support, there exists a suitably small neighborhood of xK ,
call it N (xK), such that 1 +KTx < 0 for x ∈ N (xK) and
P (X ∈ N (xK)) > 0.
We now claim that the existence of such a neighborhood
implies that g(K) = −∞. Indeed, to prove this, we first
observe that
g(K) = E[log(1 +KTX)]
=
∫
log(1 +KTx)fX(x)dx
=
∫
1+KTx≤0
log(1 +KTx)fX (x) dx
+
∫
1+KT x>0
log(1 +KTx)fX (x) dx.
Using the property of logarithmic function that
log(1 +KTx) ≤ |KTx|
for all x satisfying 1+KTx > 0, we obtain an upper bound
for g(K). That is,
g(K) ≤
∫
1+KT x≤0
log(1 +KTx)fX (x) dx+
∫
1+KT x>0
∣∣∣KTx
∣∣∣ fX (x) dx
≤
∫
1+KT x≤0
log(1 +KTx)fX (x) dx+
∫
‖K‖ ‖x‖fX (x) dx
≤
∫
1+KT x≤0
log(1 +KTx)fX (x) dx+ ‖K‖ E[‖X‖].
Since E[‖X‖] < ∞, it suffices to show that the integral
above has value −∞. Indeed, beginning with the fact that
P (X ∈ N (xK)) > 0
and noting that N (xK) ⊆ {x : 1 + KTx ≤ 0},
the density function fX must assign positive
probability to the set {x : 1 +KTx ≤ 0}. Furthermore,
since log(1 +KTx) = −∞ for x satisfying 1 +KTx ≤ 0,
it follows that∫
1+KT x≤0
log(1 +KTx)fX (x) dx = −∞
and we conclude that g(K) = −∞ as required.
To complete the proof, we establish closedness and convexity
of K using a rather standard convex analysis argument:
Indeed, for each fixed x ∈ X , we define the linear func-
tion Lx(K)
.
= −KTx and associated set
Kx
.
= {K : Lx(K) ≤ 1}.
Note, that Kx, being a halfspace, is a closed convex set. Now,
using the definition of the support function, it follows that
K =
⋂
x∈X
Kx.
Hence, since K is the intersection of an indexed collection
of closed convex sets, it is also closed and convex. 
Scalar Result as a Special Case: To see that the
Scalar Betting Lemma in Section 5 is a special case of
the above, we recall notation Xmin and Xmax and as-
sume Xmin < 0 and Xmax > 0 as in the earlier sections.
Now, for K > 0, the support function in the theorem
above becomes hX (−K) = −KXmin and for K < 0, it
becomes hX (−K) = −KXmax. Hence the requirement of
the theorem hX (−K) ≤ 1 leads to the interval confinement
condition of the lemma.
Hypercube Support Set: One n-dimensional generalization
of the scalar situation above is obtained when the convex
hull of the support of X , convX , is a hypercube. Suppose
this hypercube has center x0 and components xi satisfy-
ing |xi − x0i | ≤ δi where δi > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then
using a basic fact about support functions, see [18, p. 269],
that hX (y) = hconvX (y) for all y ∈ Rn, a straightforward
calculation leads to
hX (−K) =
n∑
i=1
|Ki|δi −
n∑
i=1
Kix
0
i .
Hence, application of the theorem leads to the requirement
that any optimizing Kelly fraction vector K satisfies the
condition
n∑
i=1
|Ki|δi −
n∑
i=1
Kix
0
i ≤ 1.
Hypersphere Support Set: As a final example, suppose the
convex hull of the support set X is a hypersphere in Rn with
description ‖x − x0‖ ≤ r with euclidean norm used above,
center x0, and radius r > 0. Then using an argument which
is similar to that used for the hypercube example above, we
can easily show that any optimizer K must satisfy
r‖K‖ −KTx0 ≤ 1.
We note that the constraint sets
Kr
.
= {K : r‖K‖ −KTx0 ≤ 1}
are nested. That is, if radii r1 ≤ r2, then the set Kr2 ⊆ Kr1 .
In Figure 2, these sets are depicted for x0 = (1/2, 1/2) and
various radii r1 = 1, r2 = 1.25, r3 = 2, r4 = 3 and r5 = 5.
VII. EXAMPLE INVOLVING HIGH-FREQUENCY
Thus far, our analysis of the restricted betting phenomenon
has included no consideration of the frequency with which
wagers are being made. In this regard, we imagine the
frequency of betting to be so high as to make it seem “reason-
able” for the theoretician to use a continuous-time stochastic
model to determine the optimal betting fraction. The question
we consider is as follows: For the high-frequency case
with sufficiently many samples being used to construct the
empirical distribution, is there still a disparity between theory
and practice? That is, is it still the case that the theoretical
solution can end up being far too conservative? In [19], an
Fig. 2: Constraint Sets Kr for Optimal Fraction K
issue with rather similar flavor is considered in the context of
portfolio optimization and the analysis given is much more
abstract than that given below. Here we consider a concrete
example and provide no significant result of general import.
Our main objective is to raise issues for future research.
Indeed, we begin with high-frequency historical intra-day
tick data for APPLE (ticker AAPL). Each “tick” corresponds
to a new stock price S(k) and the time between arrivals
of ticks is estimated on average to be about one tenth of
a second. This stock-price data is plotted in Figure 3 for
the period 9:30:00 am to 2:13:47 pm on December 2, 2015.
During this period, we have m = 110, 000 ticks. The first
step in our analysis was to use the time series prices S(k)
to calculate the corresponding returns
X(k) =
S(k + 1)− S(k)
S(k)
.
Given the small time between consecutive ticks, a large
percentage of the X(k) turn out to be zero; i.e., the price
did not change from k to k+1. In addition, the smallness of
the inter-tick times leads to the remaining probability masses
largely concentrated between x = −0.0002 and x = 0.0002
and the data leads to Xmin ≈ −0.01 ≈ −Xmax. Thus,
the Restricted Betting Theorem forces the approximate
bound −100 ≤ K ≤ 100 which is not really meaningful
since brokerage requirements typically limit |K| ≤ 2. Based
on the empirical data, we plotted g(K) and obtained the
optimal betting fraction Kˆ∗ ≈ 0.824. Interestingly, although
the price has no obvious “bullish” pattern, we see that the
theory leads to a rather aggressive bet size which is more
than 80% of one’s wealth. In contrast, if we assume that the
data for this example, comes from a discrete-time Geometric
Brownian Motion with this same mean and variance, we
obtain K∗ = 0 by the Restricted Betting Theorem.
It is interesting to note that other methods in the lit-
erature which might be used for the same problem
lead to optimal K-values which are remarkably close
to Kˆ∗ ≈ 0.824 obtained above. For example using
estimated mean µˆ ≈ 1.628× 10−8 and standard devia-
tion σˆ ≈ 1.405× 10−4 as the basis for a continuous time
Geometric Brownian Motion model, the analysis in [2]
involves optimizing the expected value having combination
of consumption utility and logarithm of terminal wealth. As
the consumption weighting tends to zero, the optimal fraction
tends to K∗ = µˆ/σˆ2 ≈ 0.825. The same result is obtained
in [8] using the same expected logarithmic growth criterion
and assuming a stochastic process model with bounded
returns X(k) with mean µˆ and standard deviation σˆ.
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Fig. 3: AAPL Tick-by-Tick Price of Trade
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we considered a random vector X and com-
pared the size of Kelly bets which are derived using a
purely theoretical probability distribution versus those which
are obtained from its empirically-obtained counterpart. In
making this comparison, the support set X forX was seen to
play a crucial role. As seen in the Restricted Betting Theorem
in Section 6, when the logarithmic growth function g(K) is
maximized, this set X can lead to “unreasonable” restrictions
on the optimal betting fraction K∗. By this we mean roughly
the following: Possible outcomes for X which are “large”
can lead to the possibility that extremely attractive betting
opportunities are rejected. On the other hand, when betting is
based on an empirically derived distribution forX , it is likely
that such rare events will not be reflected in the resulting
probability mass function. The bet size which results will be
more in line with common sense.
These results open the door to a new line of research which
might be appropriately called “data-driven Kelly betting.” In
such an empirical framework, new problems involving the
sample size m will be of fundamental importance. Given
that many betting processes involve non-stationary stochastic
processes, there is typically a bound m ≤M which must be
respected when deriving the empirical distribution. That is,
when the analysis involves sequential betting based on i.i.d.
random variables, the use of “untrustworthy old data” from
far in the past may be inappropriate to use.
A second important future research direction involves ex-
tension of Kelly-based analysis to problems involving the
betting frequency. This topic, touched upon in Section 7, does
not appear to have been heavily considered in the literature;
e.g., see [19] for results available to date. In this setting,
many new modeling and analysis questions arise involving
what betting frequencies are available and the model of the
random variable X changes as a function of frequency. For
example, if even-money coin flips are carried out at some
frequency f , the model for X does not change from bet to
bet; i.e., the bet is independent of frequency. On the other
hand, if X corresponds to the return on a stock based on
sampling of a continuous-time Brownian motion, appropriate
scaling of the mean and variance become important issues
as the frequency increases.
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